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EUPHEMISM AND JUS COGENS 
G. Alex Sinha* 
ABSTRACT—Jus cogens norms of international law encompass the 
most stringent prohibitions of the law of nations. They reflect a global—and 
typically moral—consensus about impermissible conduct so complete and 
forceful that no derogation is permissible under any circumstances. Yet 
states derogate nevertheless. Lacking any valid legal justification for 
violating jus cogens norms, derogating states instead seek to euphemize their 
unlawful conduct. Doing so appears at a glance to be a calculated choice that 
allows States to have their cake and eat it too—to acknowledge the 
peremptory norms that purportedly bind all sovereigns while acting freely in 
violation of those norms by describing away their own misconduct. Perhaps 
the most famous recent example of this phenomenon is the United States’ 
use of the term “enhanced interrogation” to describe its methods for torturing 
individuals detained in the early years of the War on Terror. 
Through a case study of the CIA’s torture program, this essay explores 
the distinctive and underappreciated link between euphemism and jus 
cogens. It argues that the special legal-moral character of peremptory norms 
of international law creates an intrinsic connection between false denials of 
legal liability and misleading moral descriptions. Thus, far from reflecting 
an independent messaging decision, the State’s deployment of euphemism 
to soften perceptions of its conduct flows necessarily from any decision it 
takes to deny legal liability. Moreover, these euphemisms tend to reverse the 
moral valence of the conduct at issue, suggesting it is not inexcusable but 
rather both legal and essential. The consequences of such euphemisms—
their influence on public opinion and on lower-level officials empowered to 
carry out violations—are therefore substantial, and arise independently of 
any specific incentive to produce such effects. Euphemism thus operates as 
a powerful and surprisingly sophisticated device to facilitate law-breaking, 
even as its use is entailed by the State’s legal denials. One primary effect of 
this dynamic is paradoxical: it tends to strengthen international recognition 
of relevant peremptory norms while simultaneously undermining the 
practical effect of those norms. 
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In January of 2020, James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen, the two architects 
of the CIA’s torture program,1 testified under oath about the program’s 
genesis and particulars.2 Mitchell and Jessen traveled to the U.S. naval base 
at Guantánamo Bay to provide information in the capital trial of certain War-
on-Terror detainees that passed through their interrogation program years 
ago. It was the first time that the two psychologists have testified publicly 
 
 1 At times, James Mitchell has resisted the notion that he was an “architect” of the program on the 
stated basis that, in developing it, he and Jessen were not “breaking new ground.” Mitchell Dep. Tr. at 
342:1–5, Jan. 16, 2017, Salim v. Mitchell, 2:15-CV-286-JLQ, (E.D. Wash.) [hereinafter Mitchell Dep.]. 
Nevertheless, he and Jessen largely designed and implemented the program and the label is relatively 
common in media coverage of his role. See, e.g., Sheri Fink and James Risen, Psychologists Open a 
Window on Brutal C.I.A. Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/20/us/cia-torture.html (utilizing the term “architect” to 
describe Mitchell and Jessen, and tracing the provenance of that moniker to unnamed CIA officials). See 
also Mitchell Dep. 322:21–22 (acknowledging that “they had called me [an architect of the program] a 
lot in the press”). Note that some refer to the CIA’s interrogation program as the “Rendition, Detention 
and Interrogation Program” (RDI Program). See, e.g., Steven M. Kleinman, Reflecting on Torture After 
‘The Report’, LAWFARE (Dec. 16, 2019, 9:00AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/reflecting-torture-after-
report (adopting that term). The initial public debate about how to characterize the program has given 
way to a broad consensus that the program amounted to torture. See infra note 7, 19; Bob Egelko, For 
first time, court calls U.S. “enhanced interrogation techniques” torture, S.F. CHRONICLE (Sep. 18, 2019, 
8:28 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/nation/article/For-first-time-court-calls-U-S-enhanced-
14451011.php; Carol Rosenberg, What the C.I.A.’s Torture Program Looked Like to the Tortured, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/us/politics/cia-torture-drawings.html. 
 2 Carol Rosenberg, Psychologist Who Waterboarded for C.I.A. to Testify at Guantánamo, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/us/politics/911-trial-psychologists.html. 
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about such matters,3 and it came approximately 18 years after they 
participated in the first brutal CIA interrogation of a detainee in the War on 
Terror in 2002.4 It also came 14 years after the pair had snowballed that initial 
interrogation into a long-term contractual relationship with the CIA, valued 
at over $180 million, to construct and implement the torture program;5 eleven 
years after the CIA terminated the torture contract early (having paid out $81 
million);6 six years after President Obama conceded that Mitchell and 
Jessen’s program amounted to torture;7 and less than three years after 
 
 3 See Julian Borger, Guantánamo: psychologists who designed CIA torture program to testify, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/20/guantanamo-
psychologists-cia-torture-program-testify (reporting, in advance of their appearance at Guantánamo, that 
Mitchell and Jessen were “due to give evidence in open court for the first time this week”). Both were 
also deposed as part of an earlier civil lawsuit brought against them by the ACLU, and those transcripts 
are now available online as well, although that testimony was not given before a public audience. See 
generally ACLU, Salim v. Mitchell – James Mitchell Deposition Transcript, TORTURE DATABASE (Jan. 
16, 2017), https://www.thetorturedatabase.org/document/salim-v-mitchell-james-mitchell-deposition-
transcript?search_url=search/apachesolr_search/deposition and ACLU, Salim v. Mitchell – Bruce Jessen 
Deposition Transcript, THE TORTURE DATABASE (Jan. 20, 2017), 
https://www.thetorturedatabase.org/document/salim-v-mitchell-bruce-jessen-deposition-
transcript?search_url=search/apachesolr_search/deposition (providing the transcript for each 
psychologist’s deposition, which includes both their respective testimony and the identities of everyone 
in attendance when the depositions were taken). Note that, as a member of the relevant team at the ACLU 
in the first half of 2015, I was involved in the early stages of preparing the suit, but I departed before the 
complaint was filed. 
 4 Trial Tr. 30288:23–30289:6, United States v. Khalid Shaikh Mohammad (Jan. 21, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS21Jan2020-MERGED).pdf 
[hereinafter KSM Transcript] (“Q. In April 2002, you attended the meeting. As a result of that meeting, 
you were engaged as a consultant in an interrogation of Abu Zubaydah; is that right? A. (James Mitchell): 
Correct.  Q. Okay. And what was your role in that interrogation? A. It was to monitor the resistance to 
interrogation techniques that he employed and to suggest countermeasures.”); Jessen Dep. Tr. at 103:1–
4, Jan. 20, 2017, Salim v. Mitchell, 2:15-CV-286-JLQ, (E.D. Wash.) [hereinafter Jessen Dep.] (noting 
that Jessen came to work with the CIA around July 2002). 
 5 Robert Windrem, CIA Paid Torture Teachers More than $80 Million, NBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2014, 
12:32 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/cia-torture-report/cia-paid-torture-teachers-more-80-
million-n264756 (reporting that, in 2006, the base value of Mitchell and Jessen’s contract had swelled to 
over $180 million). See also S. Rep. No. 113-288, at 168 (2014) (Rep. on Central Intelligence Agency’s 
Detention and Interrogation Program) 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf (“By 2006, 
the value of the base contract for their company, with all options exercised, was in excess of $180 
million.”). 
 6 Windrem, supra note 5 (reporting that, when the contract for Mitchell and Jessen’s company was 
terminated in 2009, the CIA had paid out $81 million). 
 7 See Josh Gerstein, Obama: ‘We tortured some folks’, POLITICO (Aug. 1, 2014, 3:38 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2014/08/john-brennan-torture-cia-109654 (quoting President Obama at a 
2014 press conference as stating, “We tortured some folks. When we engaged in some of these enhanced 
interrogation techniques, techniques that I believe and I think any fair-minded person would believe were 
torture, we crossed a line. And that needs to be understood and accepted.”). Note that President Obama 
specifically referred to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EITs) as “torture.” Id. Those are the 
techniques that James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen organized into an interrogation program. See Mitchell 
Dep. at 317:20-23 (acknowledging that Mitchell recommended methods that became known as EITs); 
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Mitchell and Jessen settled a civil suit accusing them, through their work on 
the program, of violating several jus cogens norms of international law 
(including the prohibition on torture).8 
Jus cogens is a popular subject of legal scholarship,9 although much of 
the debate about it borders on the metaphysical.10 The phrase “jus cogens” 
operates interchangeably with the term “peremptory norms,”11 both of which 
 
Jessen Dep. 114:20-115:11, Jan. 20, 2017 (describing how Mitchell and Jessen used a typewriter in a CIA 
cubicle to generate a list of techniques borrowed from SERE training). Significantly, President Obama’s 
comments did not refer to extreme techniques utilized by the CIA outside the legal approvals that attached 
to the formal EIT program, some of which drew objections even from James Mitchell. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 
30963:18-30964:1, Jan. 24, 2020 (in which Mitchell acknowledged witnessing a “bath” administered by 
interrogators “where they took a brush . . . and they would scrub the ass, scrub the balls, and then scrub 
the face of Mr. Nashiri,” as a result of which Mitchell submitted a complaint to an inspector general); id. 
at 31005:3-14 (Q. Sir, during the course of your testimony earlier in the week, you had an opportunity to 
recount in fairly graphic, harrowing detail the shackling and the kneeling and bending of Mr. al Nashiri. 
You described it as having two men actually hold him by the shoulders and forcibly force his back to the 
ground while he had a broomstick behind his knees and hearing him scream in agony. Do you recall that? 
A. (Mitchell). I do recall it. Q. Okay. And you were -- you were very upset by seeing that? A. (Mitchell). 
Yes.” 
 8 See Larry Siems, CIA torture: lawsuit settled against psychologists who designed techniques, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2017, 2:31PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/17/cia-torture-
lawsuit-settled-against-psychologists-who-designed-techniques (reporting on the August 2017 settlement 
of the suit). 
 9 See Markus Petsche, Jus Cogens as a Vision of the International Legal Order, 29 PENN ST. INT’L 
L. REV. 233, 235–36 (2010) (reviewing the literature on jus cogens); see also Andrea Bianchi, Human 
Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 491 (2008); Georg Schwarzenberger, 
International Jus Cogens? 43 TEX. L. REV. 455 (1965); Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus 
Cogens as Formulated by the International Law Commission, 61 AM. J. INT’L. L. 946 (1967); A. Mark 
Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, As Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (1995); Anthony D’Amato, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s Jus Cogens, 6 CONN. 
J. INT’L L. 1 (1990); Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental 
to International Society, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (1988); Thomas Weatherall, Lessons from the Alien Tort 
Statute: Jus Cogens as the Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1362–63 (2015); Evan J. Criddle & Evan 
Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331 (2009); M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1996); 
David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus Cogens: 
Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219 (2005); Hilary Charlesworth & Christine 
Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 66 (1993); Gaela Normile, The Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons As Jus Cogens, 124 PENN ST. L. REV. 277 (2019). 
 10 See, e.g., Petsche, supra note 9, at 235–36 (summarizing the state of the literature on jus cogens). 
As recently as 2014, the International Law Commission’s Special Rapporteur on Peremptory Norm of 
General International Law (Jus Cogens), observed that it remained valuable for the ILC to provide 
commentary on “(a) the nature of jus cogens; (b) requirements for the identification of a norm as jus 
cogens; (c) an illustrative list of norms which have achieved the status of jus cogens; (d) consequences or 
effects of jus cogens.” Dire D. Tladi (Special Rapporteur on Peremptory Norm of General International 
Law (Jus Cogens)), Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep, on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc, A/69/10, 
¶ 93 (2014). 
 11 Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 298 (2006) 
(“The terms jus cogens and peremptory norms are used interchangeably. Article 53 of the VCLT . . . is 
entitled ‘Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens).’”) See 
19:1 (2020) Northwestern Journal of Human Rights 
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refer to the most stringent restrictions imposed under general international 
law: restrictions that apply universally and may never be transgressed 
lawfully.12 Scholars and relevant experts, like the International Law 
Commission,13 have examined the nature of these norms at a high level of 
abstraction. For example, some have explored the links between the 
peremptory nature of jus cogens norms, their content, and their place at the 
top of the hierarchy of international law.14 Others have debated the proper 
relationship between jus cogens and sovereign immunity.15 
There is a pressing need to gain a better understanding of how States 
approach their jus cogens obligations in practice, however—in part because, 
despite the primacy of peremptory norms in the hierarchy of international 
law, their violation is not all that rare.16 The striking tension between the 
theoretical nature of jus cogens obligations and the practical effect of those 
obligations cries out for explanation. This Essay explores the practical 
implications of peremptory norms’ unique features, focusing on the 
overwhelmingly moral character of jus cogens and its strict prohibition on 
derogation. In doing so, the Essay uncovers important connections between 
the nature of peremptory norms and the manner in which States respond to 
them. 
Section I lays out some background to jus cogens. Section II argues that 
States face a peculiar configuration of pressures in contemplating 
compliance with jus cogens norms: high reputational costs for 
noncompliance paired with limited formal legal liability. The gaping chasm 
between immense informal pressure to uphold peremptory norms and weak 
 
also Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of the Seventieth Session, Chapter VIII: Peremptory norms of 
general international law (jus cogens), U.N. Doc A/73/10, at 224 (2018) (“At its sixty-ninth session, 
following a proposal by the Special Rapporteur in his second report, the Commission decided to change 
the title of the topic from “Jus cogens” to “Peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens)”.) 
 12 See infra notes 29–33. 
 13 The International Law Commission is a body of experts operating under the auspices of the United 
Nations with the purpose of “initiat[ing] studies and mak[ing] recommendations for the purpose of . . . 
encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification.” International Law 
Commission, UNITED NATIONS, https://legal.un.org/ilc/. 
 14 See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 11, at 291–92 (exploring the hierarchy of international law, focusing 
on jus cogens norms at the top and on soft law at the bottom, and observing that “a review of the literature 
as well as the jurisprudence reveals confusion over the rationale for jus cogens norms and their source, 
content, and impact, as well as the interface of such norms with obligations erga omnes and international 
crimes.”). 
 15 See Petsche, supra note 9, at 236. See also Adam C. Belsky, et. al., Implied Waiver Under the 
Fsia: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 
CAL. L. REV. 365 (1989) (exploring the link between jus cogens and sovereign immunity); Sevrine 
Knuchel, State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens, 9 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 149 (2011) (doing 
the same); Thomas Weatherall, Jus Cogens and Sovereign Immunity: Reconciling Divergence in 
Contemporary Jurisprudence, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1151 (2015) (doing the same). 
 16 See infra note 41. 
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legal penalties for failure to do so17 incentivizes States to acknowledge the 
relevant norms while mis-describing—and more specifically, 
euphemizing—their own conduct, even when the descriptions offered are 
absurd on their face. The effect of this strategy is to reinforce the global 
consensus that a particular norm exists while chiseling away at the content 
of the norm, thereby undermining its practical effect. Section II also 
identifies a necessary connection between euphemism and jus cogens, 
arguing that the distinctively moral nature of the legal concepts implicated 
by peremptory norms ensures that, to deny an allegation that one has violated 
jus cogens is to defend one’s conduct both on a legal and on a moral level. 
In doing the latter, States must minimize the moral disapproval warranted by 
their conduct, using denials that are inherently euphemistic—often 
maximally so, leading to characterizations of their conduct as morally or 
legally obligatory rather than inexcusable.18 
Finally, Section III argues that the consequences of the State’s 
endorsement of euphemistic descriptions iterate down the chain of command 
and then down to the public, greasing the wheels for more egregious 
violations of the applicable norms and anchoring public debate about the 
conduct in question in the State’s favor. To illustrate how that dynamic plays 
out in practice, Section III considers the interrogation program spearheaded 
by Mitchell and Jessen. For two primary reasons, that disturbing case 
presents a serendipitous window into the interplay of jus cogens prohibitions 
and State conduct. First, a subsequent U.S. administration has unequivocally 
conceded that the conduct in question violated jus cogens. That assessment 
aligns with the near-consensus of observers, independent news media, and 
domestic judges.19 Thus, for all the contemporaneous controversy 
 
 17 Stronger States arguably face lighter formal consequences for violating jus cogens than weaker 
States. For example, States with permanent seats on the Security Council, or States with strong or 
numerous allies, may be especially well positioned to avoid formal consequences for violations of 
peremptory norms. 
 18 For more on the applicable definition of “euphemism,” see infra note 44. Notably, others have also 
observed that States adopt misleading characterizations in connection with the commission of serious 
crimes. See, e.g., MICHAEL G. KEARNEY, THE PROHIBITION OF PROPAGANDA FOR WAR IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) (“No state crimes, whether genocide, crimes against humanity or war 
crimes are ever committed without prior propaganda aimed at securing popular support for the proposed 
illegal actions.”). 
 19 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE 55, (July 2011) (noting that “the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Committee Against Torture, the UN special rapporteur 
on torture, and the UN special rapporteur on protecting human rights while countering terrorism” have 
all concluded that waterboarding is torture). Certain U.S. courts share that view. See Court calls US 
“enhanced interrogation techniques” torture, AP NEWS (Sept. 19, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/2a4bc9d48a884cab8356e6a6c50f89ab. It is now typical for news outlets to refer to 
“enhanced interrogation” as torture, even in straight news reporting. See, e.g., Borger, Guantánamo: 
psychologists who designed CIA torture program to testify, supra note 3; Carol Rosenberg, What the 
19:1 (2020) Northwestern Journal of Human Rights 
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surrounding the CIA’s program, history has rendered its judgment 
unequivocally and concluded that, at minimum, parts of the program 
inflicted torture on detainees.20 Second, Mitchell and Jessen are perfectly 
positioned to provide testimony about the nature of the program, having 
played an essential role in shaping it and personally administering parts of it. 
They have provided such testimony in spades. In addition to Mitchell’s book 
and other public remarks on the subject, both Mitchell and Jessen were 
deposed for a relatively recent civil suit and the duo testified before a military 
commission for a period of roughly two weeks in early 2020, collectively 
generating hundreds of pages of new, rich data.21 
The relationship between euphemism and jus cogens identified in this 
Essay is intrinsic; it holds regardless of which States or peremptory norms 
are at issue. The analysis provided below therefore illuminates dynamics at 
play whenever a State engages in conduct that infringes a peremptory norm 
of international law (or even a norm that approaches peremptory status). 
I. BRIEF BACKGROUND TO JUS COGENS 
As noted above, there is a vast literature on the history and various 
theoretical dimensions of jus cogens.22 Although its roots go back further,23 
the term formally entered the legal lexicon in 1969 through Article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which addresses 
“Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law 
(‘jus cogens’).” According to the VCLT, jus cogens encompasses “norm[s] 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole 
 
C.I.A.’s Torture Program Looked Like to the Tortured, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/us/politics/cia-torture-drawings.html; Douglas A. Johnson, et. al., 
The Strategic Costs of Torture, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept./Oct. 2016), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/strategic-costs-torture; Sacha Pfeiffer, CIA Used 
Prisoner As ‘Training Prop’ For Torture, Psychologist Testifies, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 23, 
2020, 11:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/23/799130233/psychologist-who-helped-create-
interrogation-methods-says-cia-may-have-gone-too; Michael Conte, Newly released illustrations depict 
post-9/11 torture techniques, CNN (Dec. 6, 2019, 3:12 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/06/politics/torture-techniques-report/index.html. 
 20 There remain difficult definitional questions about what amounts to torture in violation of jus 
cogens or the Convention Against Torture. Considered in isolation or in the abstract, some of the 
techniques authorized by the CIA—the “facial grasp,” for example—may not rise to the level or torture. 
But such difficulties have not prevented the international community from coalescing around a consensus 
view of the program as a whole, which at points plainly (if only in retrospect for some) violated the norm 
prohibiting torture. Supra note 19. 
 21 Some of the (nominally) public testimony is redacted. See, e.g., KSM Transcript at 30209–10, 
30214, 30234, 30259–60 (Jan. 21, 2020). 
 22 See supra notes 9–10. 
 23 Shelton, supra note 11, at 297–98 (“The notion of jus cogens . . . was discussed at length for the 
first time by Verdross in 1937.”). 
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as . . . norm[s] from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character.”24 Originally, the concept operated exclusively “as a 
limitation on international freedom of contract.”25 That limitation persists as 
one facet of jus cogens: Treaties that would otherwise be valid are void if, 
upon coming into force, they conflict with extant peremptory norms26 or if a 
contradictory peremptory norm comes into effect after the treaty is 
concluded.27 But the VCLT language makes plain that the concept operates 
more broadly than that. Whatever jus cogens encompasses, its violation is 
impermissible, full stop; there are no exceptions, justifications, or excuses 
that permit deviation from its requirements. Nor may States evade the reach 
of jus cogens by persistently objecting to its restrictions, an option available 
to States when resisting weaker forms of customary international law.28 
By and large, jus cogens norms prohibit conduct characterized by 
severe moral disapprobation.29 Although the list of norms is fluid,30 
peremptory norms likely include prohibitions on (inter alia) piracy, slavery, 
 
 24 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. For some 
background on the evolution of jus cogens, see Shelton, supra note 11, at 297–302 (detailing the rise of 
the concept of jus cogens and identifying some of its intellectual antecedents in international law); 
Petsche, supra note 9, at 238–41 (tracing the earliest theoretical discussions of the concept of jus cogens 
to the first half of the 20th century, but attributing the first formal recognition of it to the 1969 VCLT). 
See also Bianchi, supra note 9, at 493 (noting that jus cogens was not sanctioned by courts until the 1990s, 
before which it was developed largely through legal scholarship). 
 25 Shelton, supra note 11, at 297. 
 26 Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 53 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it 
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.”). 
 27 Id. art. 64 (“If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty 
which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.”). 
 28 See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International 
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 765 (2001) (noting that “custom is generally binding 
except for the limited and contentious persistent objector rule” but that “substantive morality of jus 
cogens norms outweighs the procedural right of sovereign states to become persistent objectors to them”). 
See also Shelton, supra note 11, at 305 (noting that persistent objection to jus cogens norms “is likely to 
arise rarely because those norms most often identified as jus cogens are clearly accepted 
as customary international law and there are no persistent objectors.”). 
 29 Roberts, supra note 28, at 765 (“[J]us cogens norms prohibit fundamentally immoral conduct 
[ . . . .] “); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 
424 (1983) (observing that “this normative differentiation [between peremptory norms and less elite or 
lower-ranking norms] is certainly inspired by unimpeachable moral concerns”). But see Weisburd, supra 
note 9, at 21–22 (noting an example “of a writer who, prior to World War II, argued that jus cogens 
forbade a state to surrender one of its nationals for war crimes trials, but who wrote after the war that the 
crimes described in the London Declaration had become a matter of jus cogens[,]” which, if correct, 
suggests the possibility of jus cogens norms bearing a murkier connection to moral injunctions.). 
 30 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Teree E. Foster, More Speech, Less Noise: Amplifying Content-
Based Speech Regulations Through Binding International Law, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 59, 95 
(1995) (“Given the distinctive nature of jus cogens as a dynamic concept, no absolutely exact, concise 
list of jus cogens rules can exist.”). 
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genocide, military aggression, crimes against humanity, grave war crimes, 
systematic racial discrimination, and torture,31 in addition, arguably, to 
certain forms of human experimentation32 and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment (CIDT).33 Several of these crimes now fall within the jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC), although ICC jurisdiction is not a 
necessary condition for peremptory status.34 Given the nature of the conduct 
they proscribe, jus cogens norms purportedly give rise not just to universal 
jurisdiction (empowering all States to prosecute violations) but also to 
stronger obligations erga omnes that require States to prosecute or extradite 
(and punish if convicted) those implicated in criminal violations of 
peremptory norms.35 
 
 31 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives 
and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 108 (2001) (identifying prohibitions on piracy, 
slavery, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, apartheid, and torture as rising to the level of jus 
cogens); Mayer-Schönberger & Foster, supra note 30, at 100 (identifying “aggressive warfare” as another 
violation of peremptory norms). The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law rather tentatively 
provides a similar list. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Restatement’s Treatment of Sources and Evidence 
of International Law, 25 INT’L LAW. 311, 321 n. 53 (1991) (quoting the Restatement’s identification of 
norms that “might” be peremptory as those barring “genocide, slave trade and slavery, apartheid and other 
gross violations of human rights, and perhaps attacks on diplomats.”). 
 32 See Jordan J. Paust, International Criminal Law Conventions and Their Penal Provisions, 92 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 812, 813 (1998) (attributing to M. Cheriff Bassiouni the view that “some unlawful human 
experimentation” rises to the level of jus cogens prohibitions). See also Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 
163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that non-consensual human experimentation is at least prohibited with 
sufficient force and specificity under customary international law to form the basis for a viable cause of 
action under the Alien Tort Statute). 
 33 Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 
368 (2009) (noting that the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations “has become an influential reference 
point when discussing well-established peremptory norms” and that it lists “cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”). But see Christopher Romero, Praying for Torture: Why the United Kingdom 
Should Ban Conversion Therapy, 51 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 201, 215 (2019) (claiming that “torture 
is considered jus cogens, but CIDT is not”). As these contrasting opinions suggest, scholars and 
international authorities may disagree to some extent about precisely which norms constitute jus cogens, 
but an exact list of qualifying norms, and whether that list is relatively long or short, is not essential for 
the argument advanced here. 
 34 Compare How the Court works, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, (July 24, 2020), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works (identifying the “four main crimes” over which the ICC has 
jurisdiction as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression) with 
Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 108 (further identifying piracy, slavery, apartheid, and torture as prohibited 
by peremptory norms of international law). 
 35 Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 148–49. Obligations erga omnes are a special kind of obligation of 
universal concern to the international community. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. 
v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 33–34 (Feb. 5, 1970) (“By their very nature [obligations of a State 
towards the international community as a whole] are the concern of all States. In view of the importance 
of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations 
erga omnes. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing 
of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights 
of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination.”) 
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As the foregoing implies, the content of jus cogens evolves over time. 
In the past several decades, a number of new prohibitions have crossed into 
the realm of peremptory norms.36 At least theoretically, changes may occur 
in the other direction as well. First, a new peremptory norm might arise that 
trims, expands, or overturns an existing one.37 Second, it is at least 
theoretically possible that a recognized jus cogens norm could organically 
lose favor among states, as a result of states ceasing to treat it as 
peremptory.38 Although the difficulties associated with identifying the 
threshold between ordinary norms and super or peremptory norms have long 
been the subject of concern,39 it is conceivable that moral disapproval for a 
particular type of act could erode sufficiently across the global community 
to result in the relegation of a particular norm. Third, States might pare back 
jus cogens norms—in substance, not in name—by acknowledging a 
peremptory limitation but interpreting it narrowly and persistently testing its 
 
 36 See Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 108–26 (describing, in turn, how piracy, slavery, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, genocide, apartheid, and torture joined the pantheon of peremptory norms). 
Prosper Weil famously described this phenomenon—and the attendant threat that the elite category of 
peremptory norms will soon become overcrowded—as “the destined proliferation of supernorms.” 
Weil, supra note 29, at 427. 
 37 See Adil Haque (@AdHaque110), TWITTER (Apr. 29, 2020, 7:55 AM), 
https://twitter.com/AdHaque110/status/1255465676283809803?s=20 (“Why do peremptory norms 
invalidate conflicting treaties? Because they are hierarchically superior. Says who? The ILC in its 
Fragmentation report (2006). (That’s also why they can be modified only by subsequent peremptory 
norms, says me).”) (emphasis added). 
 38 Some might resist the possibility of norms dropping out of the category of jus cogens without 
being forced out by a new peremptory norm. See Haque, supra note 37 (suggesting that only a new 
peremptory norm can modify an existing one). But it is arguable that certain norms identified by early 
theorists of jus cogens have lost status in this way. See Weisburd, supra note 9, at 21–22 (“Certainly, 
scholars’ concepts of the list of jus cogens norms have changed over the decades . . . . Verdross’ 1937 
views are hardly the only suggestions for jus cogens norms which have been made over the years that 
would seem suspect in 1995.”) Of course, such a change may not arise overnight, and it may not lie within 
the power of any single State to engineer such a result. See Joshua Ratner, Back to the Future: Why a 
Return to the Approach of the Filartiga Court is Essential to Preserve the Legitimacy and Potential of 
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 83, 114 (2002) (“There is no way for a State 
to garner the requisite international support for a modification of a jus cogens norm even if the State wants 
to do so.”) 
 39 See, e.g., Weil, supra note 29, at 427 (noting that “a rule acquires superior normative density once 
its preeminence is accepted and recognized by ‘all the essential components of the international 
community.’ But since a state’s membership in this club of ‘essential components’ is not made 
conspicuous by any particular distinguishing marks—be they geographical, ideological, economic, or 
whatever—what must happen in the end is that a number of states (not necessarily in the majority) will 
usurp an exclusive right of membership and bar entry to the others, who will find themselves not only 
blackballed but forced to accept the supernormativity of rules they were perhaps not even prepared to 
recognize as ordinary norms’’). 
19:1 (2020) Northwestern Journal of Human Rights 
11 
boundaries.40 As the following Section explores, euphemism services this 
third form of change in particular. 
II. THE INTRINSIC LINK BETWEEN EUPHEMISM AND JUS COGENS 
Despite the purported normative force of jus cogens norms, violations 
are relatively common.41 That is a rather troubling fact. After all, the basis 
for elevating a norm to peremptory status supposedly turns in part on a nearly 
universal understanding that the conduct in question is entirely 
impermissible.42 Moreover, one would expect relatively routine violations to 
 
 40 See, e.g., Bianchi, supra note 9, at 505 (“One overt attempt to challenge jus cogens has consisted 
of taking exception to the definition and the scope of application of particular norms. This is certainly the 
case for the prohibition of torture. As is known, the United States has endeavoured to provide a restrictive 
interpretation of torture for the purpose of allowing the use of particularly harsh interrogation techniques 
on terrorist suspects and providing broad defences to exempt state officials from criminal liability.”). 
 41 Beyond the CIA’s treatment of War-on-Terror detainees, there are a number of prominent 
examples from the past 30 years, including several situations that remain ongoing today. See, e.g., David 
B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, Is Resisting Genocide a Human Right?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1275 (2006) (discussing the genocide in Darfur that began in 2003); Owen Bowcott & Rebecca 
Ratcliffe, UN’s top court orders Myanmar to protect Rohingya from Genocide, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 
2020, 5:12 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/23/international-court-to-rule-on-
rohingya-genocide-safeguards (describing an order from the International Court of Justice requiring 
Myanmar to “respect the requirements of the 1948 genocide convention” and protect the Rohingya, a 
minority group within the country that has been the target of state violence for several years); The 
Associated Press, Central African Republic Armed Groups Reach Peace Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/02/world/africa/central-african-republic-peace-deal.html (reporting 
on a 2019 peace deal in the Central African Republic, which paused a six-year conflict that “carried the 
high risk of genocide” and has resulted so far in two people being sent to the ICC to face charges for 
certain violations of jus cogens); Mei Fong, China’s Xinjuang Policy: Less About Births, More about 
Control, THE ATLANTIC (July 11, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/07/china-xinjiang-one-child-birth-
control/614014/ (reporting on China’s treatment of its Uighur minority, including its use of internment 
camps and forced sterilization, and referring to the government’s program against the Uighurs as 
“genocide”); About the ICTY, U.N. INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
https://www.icty.org/en/about (last visited July 24, 2020) (summarizing the work of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which was established in 1993 to deal “with war 
crimes that took place in the Balkans in the 1990’s” and which has rendered decisions involving 
“genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity”); The ICTR in Brief, U.N. INT’L RESIDUAL 
MECHANISM FOR CRIM. TRIB., https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal (last visited July 24, 2020) 
(summarizing the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), which was 
established by the U.N. Security Council to “prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed [in 1994] in the territory of Rwanda and 
neighbouring States,” and which pursued indictments against “high-ranking military and government 
officials,” among others); Charlie Cooper, Britain would veto Russia’s return to G-7, POLITICO (June 1, 
2020, 10:34 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/01/uk-would-veto-russias-return-to-g7-
293826 (describing Boris Johnson’s opposition to readmitting Russia to the G7, from which Russia was 
expelled in 2014 when it invaded and annexed Crimea). Some have explicitly argued that Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea violated jus cogens. See infra note 66. 
 42 The better guide to peremptory norms may simply be the list of actions States generally refuse to 
acknowledge they have undertaken, regardless of the accuracy of their own labels or descriptions. See 
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wear away at any particular norm.43 But there is an organic explanation for 
the persistence of these norms, and the explanation implicates the use of 
euphemism by States accused of violating them.44 
A. Jus Cogens Norms are Simultaneously Self-Reinforcing and Self-
Undermining 
Fundamentally, tangible penalties for violating jus cogens norms are 
neither strong enough nor certain enough to hold down violations at a level 
commensurate with their ostensible weight. Although peremptory norms 
purport to bind States that never consented to them, the absence of State 
consent forecloses most avenues for legal accountability—notwithstanding 
the erga omnes nature of jus cogens obligations.45 Generally speaking, States 
retain sovereign immunity from suits alleging violations of even the hardest 
peremptory norms.46 Further, States control their own domestic criminal 
 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Memorandum of the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 16 n.34) (“In exchanges between United States embassies and all foreign states with 
which the United States maintains relations, it has been the Department of State’s general experience that 
no government has asserted a right to torture its own nationals. Where reports of torture elicit some 
credence, a state usually responds by denial or, less frequently, by asserting that the conduct was 
unauthorized or constituted rough treatment short of torture.”) 
 43 One might be tempted to conclude that jus cogens “has faded into near irrelevance.” Sue S. 
Guan, Jus Cogens: To Revise A Narrative, 26 MINN. J. INT’L L. 461, 461 (2017). Below I argue for a 
more nuanced conclusion. 
 44 A representative definition of “euphemism” is “the substitution of a mild, indirect, or vague 
expression for one thought to be offensive, harsh, or blunt.” Euphemism, DICTIONARY.COM, 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/euphemism?s=t (last visited July 27, 2020). I will focus on a subset 
of uses of the term, where the “mild, indirect, or vague” expression functions in a misleading way to blunt 
what are specifically the moral implications of a more appropriate description. In my usage, therefore, 
euphemistic terms or phrases will serve to whitewash the moral condemnation that an accurate description 
of particular conduct invites. This Section explores a distinctive link between moral descriptions and jus 
cogens, which provides the basis for focusing on that specific form of euphemism. Nevertheless, I do not 
mean to imply that the harshest available moral description of someone’s conduct is always appropriate, 
nor that it is necessarily simple to discern the most accurate description (from a moral standpoint) of any 
given program or policy. The very fact that it can be genuinely difficult to calibrate the proper level of 
moral condemnation for someone’s conduct facilitates the use of euphemism; it empowers States to select 
phrases with limited moral implications and defend those phrases as arguably appropriate. 
 45 This Essay focuses on the relationship of States to their jus cogens obligations. A somewhat 
different analysis may apply to non-state actors. 
 46 See Petsche, supra note 9, at 254–57 (summarizing the debate over whether sovereign immunity 
should yield to allegations that a state has violated peremptory norms, but noting only two courts—one 
in Italy and one in Greece—that have abrogated sovereign immunity for such a purpose). See also 
Guan, supra note 43, at 480 (“However, even as courts may theoretically endorse the concept of jus 
cogens (or concepts like it, such as obligations erga omnes), difficulties arise when courts are faced with 
the actual application of such norms to the rights of parties in resolving a concrete dispute. This is 
especially true because upholding jus cogens norms often appears to come at a high price: that of chipping 
away at accepted notions of state sovereignty–which courts, not unreasonably, have proven especially 
reluctant to do.”). Guan’s article details the reluctance of international courts to strip sovereign immunity 
from States accused of jus cogens violations, as well as minor equivocation in various State courts. Id. at 
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prosecution of bad actors, and may face self-interested or political pressures 
against undertaking such prosecutions.47 And whether addressed specifically 
by a treaty or not, compulsory jurisdiction rarely arises for States that commit 
violations.48 More typically, States must consent to the jurisdiction of a 
particular international court.49 
The ICC is the most notable exception, albeit a limited one. Although 
it only tries violations of certain jus cogens crimes,50 it may exercise 
jurisdiction “even over nationals of states that are not parties to the Treaty 
and have not otherwise consented to the court’s jurisdiction”—specifically 
“when crimes within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction are committed 
on the territory of a state that is a party to the treaty or that consents to ICC 
jurisdiction for that case.”51 Additionally, the UN Security Council may refer 
crimes to the ICC regardless of whether those crimes implicate States that 
 
480–82. But see Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 3d 935 (2019) (considering, 
as a matter of first impression, whether the United States has waived sovereign immunity for violations 
of jus cogens norms, and finding that it has). 
 47 When there is a change in political administration, the political demands to excuse criminal 
conduct of past administrations may win out. See, e.g., David Johnston & Charlie Savage, Obama 
Reluctant to Look Into Bush Programs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/us/politics/12inquire.html (reporting on President-elect Obama’s 
reluctance to pursue a significant inquiry into Bush administration abuses in the War on Terror, citing his 
“belief that we need to look forward as opposed to looking backward”). See also Scott Shane, No Charges 
Files on Harsh Tactics Used by the C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/us/holder-rules-out-prosecutions-in-cia-interrogations.html 
(reporting that Attorney General Eric Holder “had already ruled out any charges related to the use of 
waterboarding and other methods that most human rights experts consider to be torture,” and reporting 
further that, in August of 2012, the Department of Justice decided not to bring charges in the deaths of 
two detainees in the War on Terror, meaning “that the Obama administration’s limited effort to scrutinize 
the counterterrorism programs carried out under President George W. Bush has come to an end”). 
 48 Both the Convention Against Torture and the Genocide Convention, for example, give States 
substantial power over their own exposure to accountability mechanisms. See United Nations Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 6, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; United 
Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
art. 22, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 49 Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 18 (2001) (“All existing international courts have contentious jurisdiction only 
over disputes involving states that are parties to treaties providing for their jurisdiction”). 
 50 See Paust, supra note 32, at 813. 
 51 Morris, supra note 49, at 13. The United States has objected that, “by purporting to confer upon 
the court jurisdiction over the nationals of non-consenting non-party states, the [ICC Treaty] would bind 
non-parties in contravention of the law of treaties.” Id. at 14. Although the U.S. is not a party to the ICC 
Treaty, in March of 2020, the ICC authorized its prosecutor to pursue an investigation into war crimes 
committed in recent years in Afghanistan, including those that may have been committed by American 
forces, leading to an angry response from the United States. Elian Peltier & Fatima Faizi, I.C.C. Allows 
Afghanistan War Crimes Inquiry to Proceed, Angering U.S., N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/world/europe/afghanistan-war-crimes-icc.html. 
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have consented to ICC jurisdiction.52 Nevertheless, State consent to ICC 
jurisdiction remains important because it expands the geographic reach of 
the ICC, and because the prosecutor for the ICC cannot expect cooperation 
without it.53 
Moreover, violations of peremptory norms by one State will rarely 
directly aggrieve another State that has the power and political incentive to 
bring suit.54 Eventually, the international community may convene special 
tribunals in some of the most egregious cases, especially against weaker 
States or States that have lost major conflicts, but that is rare and brings with 
it mixed results.55 Recent or ongoing violations of peremptory norms by 
permanent members of the Security Council are especially unlikely to be 
 
 52 How the Court Works, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-
the-court-works (last visited Jan. 9, 2020). 
 53 See Michelle Nichols, ICC complains of lack of cooperation, wants more U.N. support, REUTERS 
(Oct. 17, 2012, 3:44 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-crime-un-icc/icc-complains-of-lack-of-
cooperation-wants-more-u-n-support-idUSBRE89G1M720121017 (reporting that the president of the 
ICC “pleaded for stronger support from the U.N. Security Council” following a refusal of States—
including members of the ICC, such as Kenya and Chad—to cooperate with the ICC’s attempts to 
prosecute Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir for war crimes allegedly committed in Darfur). Note that 
States may also withdraw their consent once they have given it. See African Union backs mass withdrawal 
from ICC, BBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38826073. 
 54 One interesting, partial exception is the recent case that The Gambia has brought against Myanmar 
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). As noted above, Myanmar is accused of violating multiple 
jus cogens norms in its treatment of the Rohingya. Although Myanmar has not consented to the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ, many Rohingya have fled Myanmar for Bangladesh, and it is through Bangladesh’s 
consent that the ICJ claims to have jurisdiction over the matter. Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to 
know about the crisis, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561. 
Even here, The Gambia is not directly aggrieved by Myanmar’s treatment of its own people, but, as a 
Muslim-majority nation, it shares a religious affinity with the Rohingya. See Michelle Ostrove et al., 
Genocide Case Against Myanmar in the ICJ, DLA PIPER (Jan. 24, 2020), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/northamerica/insights/publications/2019/12/genocide-case-against-
myanmar. More generally, although any State may in theory assert universal jurisdiction over officials 
accused of jus cogens violations, such prosecutions “remain uncommon.” DUNOFF ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS—A PROBLEM ORIENTED APPROACH 481 (Wolters 
Kluwer), 5th ed. 2020. 
 55 See, e.g., R. John Pritchard, The International Military Tribunal for the Far East and Its 
Contemporary Resonances, 149 MIL. L. REV. 25, 25 (1995) (providing background information on both 
the Nuremberg Trials and the Tokyo Trials); Seth Mydans, 11 Years, $300 Million and 3 Convictions. 
Was the Khmer Rouge Tribunal Worth It?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/world/asia/cambodia-khmer-rouge-united-nations-tribunal.html 
(detailing the limited successes of the UN-backed tribunals that prosecuted crimes committed by the 
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia); supra note 41 (providing information on the ICTR and ICTY). 
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punished in any meaningful way.56 It does not help matters that even widely-
accepted peremptory norms are relatively poorly defined.57 
On the other hand, in virtue of their substance, peremptory norms bear 
significant and distinctive moral power. First, there are no justifications, 
excuses, or mitigating factors for becoming a slaver, a torturer, or a 
genocidaire, and there is no serious basis on which to dispute the moral 
depravity implied by those labels. A State that accepts such a description for 
its ongoing conduct embraces its barbarism, communicating that, in a 
meaningful sense, it is not a civilized nation. The reputational cost of openly 
flouting such norms is nearly insuperable.58 Indeed, in light of the expressive 
force of such terms, States rarely have an incentive to concede violations,59 
no matter how egregious. It is rational (albeit cynical) for States to 
acknowledge that peremptory norms exist, or to impliedly concede that the 
accusations are serious while simply denying that their own conduct even 
approaches illegality. Doing so allows States to test the substance of the 
norms while maintaining their membership in the moral community of 
nations. 
For example, after the Bush Administration initiated the CIA torture 
program, its officials publicly maintained that “this government does not 
torture people.”60 Having impliedly acknowledged the seriousness of torture, 
the United States could not concede that the program incorporates it; instead, 
the United States described the program as “enhanced interrogation.”61 High-
 
 56 That has certainly proven true in the United States, which has essentially closed the book on the 
torture it inflicted on detainees during the first few years of the War on Terror. See supra note 47. More 
generally, permanent members of the Security Council retain special influence over certain international 
proceedings related to jus cogens violations. For example, the UN Security Council holds the power both 
to refer and to halt investigations of the ICC. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 54, at 486–89. 
 57 See supra note 20. 
 58 Less robust international norms, such as those that permit derogation or those that do not apply 
universally, plainly lack the same sort of force because States have excuses for violating them without 
inviting stigma. See also supra note 28. 
 59 The main exception is a limited one: it is possible that later administrations may face sufficient 
pressure to acknowledge the crimes of previous political leadership, as President Obama did when he 
conceded that the CIA program initiated under President Bush amounted to torture. See supra note 7. 
That acknowledgment renders the case particularly useful for analytic purposes, even if it is rare. Having 
acknowledged that serious crimes were committed, President Obama eliminated any acceptable excuse 
for declining investigations and prosecutions; but the mere acknowledgment helped to restore consensus 
about the breadth of the norm against torture. 
 60 See CIA tactics: What is ‘enhanced interrogation’?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2014), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-11723189 (attributing that quote to President Bush). See 
also Ann Gearan, Rice Signals Shift in Interrogation Policy, AP ONLINE REGIONAL—EUROPE (Dec. 8, 
2005) (“In an interview last week on ABC’s ‘Good Morning America,’ CIA Director Porter Goss said, 
‘What we do does not come close to torture.’”). 
 61 See Rules for interrogating terrorists? Yes. Torture? No., USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2006, 2006 
WLNR 16264875 (“No one in the administration uses the word torture. They refer instead to 
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level officials also repeatedly insisted the program was integral to national 
security and that it saved many American lives.62 Vice President Cheney was 
a particularly committed defender of EITs. Like President Bush, he also 
rejected the notion that “enhanced interrogation” amounted to torture.63 In 
fact, in 2018, former Vice President Cheney suggested that the United States 
should resume the CIA program.64 
Similarly, in 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula from 
Ukraine, triggering widespread condemnation from other nations.65 Some 
scholars regard Russia’s actions as a violation of peremptory norms,66 an 
appropriate conclusion if those actions amount to military aggression. 
 
“enhanced interrogation methods.”); See also Scott Shane, Backing C.I.A., Cheney Revisits Torture 
Debate From Bush Era, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/15/us/politics/cheney-senate-report-on-torture.html (quoting former 
Vice President Dick Cheney as using the term “enhanced interrogation” to describe CIA interrogation 
practices as recently as 2014). Interestingly, James Mitchell expressed recognition of the euphemistic 
character of the term “enhanced interrogation techniques.” In describing a phenomenon known as 
“abusive drift,” he testified that sometimes interrogators “start to use euphemisms for coercive pressure.” 
KSM Transcript at 30383:8–20 (Jan. 21, 2020). It was in that context that Mitchell made clear that he 
“didn’t come up with the term ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’” and that, instead, he had suggested a 
label he considered more apt, “coercive physical pressure.” Id. “But,” he added, “someone at the [CIA] 
decided it was enhanced interrogation techniques, and that’s what it was.” Id. 
 62 See CIA tactics: What is ‘enhanced interrogation’?, supra note 60. See also Bill Sammon, Cheney: 
Enhanced Interrogations ‘Essential’ in Saving American Lives, FOX NEWS (Aug. 30, 2009), 
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/cheney-enhanced-interrogations-essential-in-saving-american-lives 
(quoting Vice President Dick Cheney as stating, in 2009, that “enhanced interrogation techniques were 
absolutely essential in saving thousands of American lives and preventing further attacks against the 
United States, and giving us the intelligence we needed to go find Al Qaeda, to find their camps, to find 
out how they were being financed.”) 
 63 See Shane, supra note 61 (quoting an interview with Vice President Dick Cheney in which he 
rejected the notion that the CIA’s program constituted torture, and said he “would do it again in a 
minute . . . . Torture is what the Al Qaeda terrorists did to 3,000 Americans on 9/11. There is no 
comparison between that and what we did with respect to enhanced interrogation.”). 
 64 See Eli Okun, Dick Cheney: Restart enhanced interrogation programs, POLITICO (May 10, 2018, 
11:20 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/10/dick-cheney-enhanced-interrogation-579910 
(articulating Cheney’s view on the torture program). 
 65 See Gerard Toal et. al., Six years and $20 billion in Russian investment later, Crimeans are happy 
with Russian annexation, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/18/six-years-20-billion-russian-investment-later-
crimeans-are-happy-with-russian-annexation/ (describing the “Russian annexation,” including the 
“hastily organized and deeply contentious referendum on March 16, 2014, following Russia’s military 
occupation of the peninsula,” and the “avalanche of international criticism that followed.”). 
 66 See, e.g., Patrick Dumberry, Requiem for Crimea: Why Tribunals Should Have Declined 
Jurisdiction over the Claims of Ukrainian Investors against Russian under the Ukraine–Russia BIT, 9 J. 
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 506, 511 (2018) (describing the annexation as a violation of a jus cogens norm 
prohibiting certain uses of force); Juergen Bering, The Prohibition on Annexation: Lessons from Crimea, 
49 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 747, 758 (2017) (“Thus, annexation does constitute a per se illegal form of 
the acquisition of territory. This prohibition does not only stem from the U.N. Charter, but is also 
considered customary international law, arguably even jus cogens, a peremptory rule.”) (citations 
omitted). 
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Russian President Vladimir Putin rejects characterizations of Russia’s 
actions as an expression of military aggression, however, and instead claims 
Russia had an obligation to assume control of Crimea to protect the 
democratic will of the people there.67 
A similar pattern emerges from the ongoing situation in Myanmar in 
which the government has been accused of carrying out a genocide of its 
Rohingya population, leading to an unusual case brought by The Gambia 
before the ICJ.68 Rather than minimizing the seriousness of genocide, 
Myanmar describes its conduct in a radically different way—persistently 
characterizing its program as a series of “clearance operations” aimed at 
“terrorists.”69 
Chinese officials have taken the same approach in response to 
allegations over their ongoing treatment of the Uighurs.70 In July 2020, the 
Chinese ambassador to the United Kingdom gave an interview with the BBC 
where he was confronted with aerial footage apparently showing a large 
number of people in Xinjiang kneeling on a train platform while handcuffed 
and blindfolded.71 The interviewer claimed that Western intelligence 
agencies had authenticated the footage, determining that it shows Uighurs 
being loaded en masse and by force onto trains.72 In response, the ambassador 
eventually acknowledged the allegations of ethnic cleansing against China, 
but, rather than dismiss the seriousness of the allegation, attempted to claim 
that the allegation was implausible given putative population growth in that 
particular region of China.73 Indeed, the Chinese government has elsewhere 
defended its treatment of the Uighurs as part of a successful effort to fight 
terrorism.74 
 
 67 See Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, Address by President of the Russian Federation at the 
Kremlin (Mar. 18, 2014), (transcript available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603) 
(providing text of a speech given by President Putin in connection with the annexation, in which he stated: 
“A referendum was held in Crimea on March 16 in full compliance with democratic procedures 
and international norms . . . . Naturally, we could not leave this plea [from “residents of Crimea 
and Sevastopol” for help from Russia] unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents 
in distress. This would have been betrayal on our part.”). 
 68 See Bowcott & Ratcliffe, supra note 41; Ostrove et al., supra note 54. 
 69 Thousands in western Myanmar flee as army plans operations, monitors say, REUTERS (June 27, 
2020, 12:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rakhine/thousands-in-western-myanmar-
flee-as-army-plans-operations-monitors-say-idUSKBN23Y0Q1. 
 70 See Fong, supra note 41. 
 71 See BBC Politics (@BBCPolitics), TWITTER (Jul. 19, 2020, 5:39 AM), 
https://twitter.com/bbcpolitics/status/1284784810200838145?s=21. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See Steven Lee Myers, China Defends Crackdown on Muslims, and Criticizes Times Article, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslims-
leak.html?auth=login-email&login=email. 
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The point is not that all of these official statements are factually 
incorrect or, even if they are, that they are all lies.75 Sometimes States will 
properly deny allegations that they have violated jus cogens, and sometimes 
their officials will genuinely believe the allegations are false even when they 
are true. The point is rather that talk is cheap yet also quite important. States 
have substantial reputational reasons to deny true allegations, and the 
optimal way to do so is by acknowledging the seriousness of the allegation 
while reclassifying their own conduct—often, instead, as praiseworthy 
conduct that is in fact morally or legally obligatory. 
B. Misleading Moral Descriptions are Inherent to the False Denial of Jus 
Cogens Violations 
The foregoing suggests that we should be especially sensitive to the 
possibility that States will falsely deny allegations that they have breached 
peremptory norms, as well as cognizant of the form that false denials are 
likely to take. This subsection argues further, however, that when States 
proffer such denials, the moral judgment implicitly associated with the 
violation of jus cogens norms ensures that characterizations of conduct 
meant to elude such norms are euphemistic in a strong sense,76 generating 
significant and far-reaching consequences.77 
Many legal prohibitions piggyback on a moral judgment that the 
prohibition is appropriate. To deny that one has violated such a prohibition 
will necessarily involve a denial that one has violated some sort of applicable 
legal standard—say, a denial that one’s conduct meets the elements of a 
criminal offense. Quite frequently, however, that legalistic denial will also 
involve a re-description of one’s conduct in a morally favorable manner, 
such as by offering a morally (as well as legally) exculpatory reason for 
actions that would otherwise be criminal. When these re-descriptions are 
inaccurate, they are euphemistic in the precise sense defined above, for they 
function to blunt the moral disapproval that would otherwise accompany a 
violation one has (ex hypothesi) committed. The more moral content is 
packed into any given legal denial, the more salient the moral mis-
description of any false denial becomes. 
But in the case of jus cogens, this euphemistic character of false denials 
is both essential and distinctively important. First, as noted above, because 
 
 75 Given the overwhelming consensus about the CIA’s program, I take it as settled that President 
Bush and Vice President Cheney are at minimum incorrect in insisting that the government did not engage 
in torture. I do not take any position, however, on whether their statements faithfully reflect their own 
personal views. 
 76 See supra note 44. 
 77 See discussion infra Section III. 
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States often defend themselves against charges of jus cogens violations in 
the court of public opinion rather than before formal tribunals, the moral 
characterization of their conduct often matters more than the legal 
characterization, and thus bears greater emphasis. But second, and more 
importantly, it is the extreme immorality of conduct that renders its 
prohibition peremptory, so any legal standard built into the attendant norm 
will be tailored (however well or poorly) to that near-universal and 
overwhelming moral judgment. The norm prohibits conduct because it is so 
morally objectionable; to deny the allegation is to describe one’s conduct in 
a more morally favorable manner. 
Moreover, and third, there is no legal excuse for violating a peremptory 
norm, so a false denial requires an affirmative re-description of the conduct, 
not just the articulation of an excuse for conduct that would otherwise be 
problematic. As noted above, States often justify policies that yield jus 
cogens violations by appealing to national security considerations or 
fundamental political principles like the importance of self-governance.78 
But those justifications cannot serve as excuses for jus cogens violations 
because there is no such thing. Instead, States are likely to proffer 
overwhelming necessity for conduct that they have affirmatively re-
described in a manner that does not violate a norm at all: instead of torturing, 
for example, they engage in enhanced interrogation in the interest of national 
security. The tendency to re-characterize violations as not only falling short 
of the norm but also reflecting a crucial state priority sets up the widest 
possible chasm between the conduct as described in the allegations and the 
conduct as described by the State. The euphemistic description therefore 
conveys a particularly misleading moral valence, shifting the judgment from 
morally appalling to morally essential. 
Compare that to a prohibition that may carry some moral weight but 
does not approach peremptory status. For example, before its recent 
withdrawal from the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling, 
Japan had characterized its continued hunting of whales (ordinarily a 
violation of the treaty) as falling within the convention’s narrow carve-out 
for scientific research.79 Assuming that description was misleading, it may 
 
 78 See supra notes 60–74 and accompanying text. The pressing needs cited by States (for conduct 
that they claim is lawful anyway) would tend to reveal their awareness that they have approached, or even 
crossed, a red line. As explored in more detail below, the heft of such considerations—the worry that they 
will bear responsibility for failing to stop a terrorist attack, for example—naturally imposes significant 
pressure on lower-level officials to follow orders that may not be lawful. See infra notes 96–98 and 
accompanying text. 
 79 Simon Denyer, Japan to leave International Whaling Commission, resume commercial hunting, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2018, 11:22 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/japan-to-leave-
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have been euphemistic because it suggested that Japan had a reason for 
engaging in whaling that was more morally acceptable to observers.80 But 
the moral description is less salient in this case than the legal denial, and less 
consequential. After all, Japan did not have to deny that it engaged in 
whaling altogether; it cited a legally acceptable excuse for doing so. And 
ultimately, even if the prohibition on whaling reflects an adverse judgment 
about the morality of the practice, Japan withdrew from the treaty and 
resumed commercial whaling, dropping any pretense of engaging in 
scientific research and biting the bullet on any moral disapproval that 
followed.81 
Even traditional criminal law prohibitions on malum in se offenses, 
such as murder, theft, rape, and so forth, fall far short of jus cogens in carving 
out a meaningful role for euphemism.82 For one, few traditional criminal 
offenses bear the moral opprobrium of jus cogens crimes; and, even to the 
extent they may still carry substantial moral weight, a defendant can invoke 
mitigating factors to blunt some or all of the typical moral and legal 
consequences of the offense. A denial can therefore concede the underlying 
conduct while also providing additional exculpatory information. But private 
offenses introduce a new and important consideration: even leaving aside the 
possibility of mitigation, a private defendant’s position on whether his 
conduct meets certain legal elements or whether it was as morally bad as 
prosecutors allege does not generally carry the propensity to shape the 
content of the law itself, or to move debates over public policy. The potency 
of the euphemism is especially great when the entity accused of violating 
such a legal prohibition has significant persuasive power—when, as in the 
case of a State actor, its own description of the conduct carries legal and 




 80 Of course, some States might oppose whaling both for commercial purposes and for scientific 
research. See Grant Wyeth, Australia Unhappy About Japan’s Return to Whaling, THE DIPLOMAT (July 
3, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/australia-unhappy-about-japans-return-to-whaling/ 
(describing Australia’s history of tension with Japan over its whaling practices and noting Australia’s 
opposition to whaling for any purpose). 
 81 Denyer, supra note 79. 
 82 See Avi Samuel Garbow, The Federal Environmental Crimes Program: The Lorax and Economics 
101, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 47, 51 n.18 (2001) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary to define a malum in se 
offense as one that is wrong in itself, not wrong because it is prohibited by law). 
 83 See G. Alex Sinha, Lies, Gaslighting and Propaganda, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 1037, 1076–87 (2020) 
(arguing that certain manipulative communications rise to the level of propaganda in part because of the 
persuasive power of the communicator, and identifying the sophistication and resources of sovereign 
governments as key bases of persuasive power). A major factor behind sovereign persuasive power is 
that media platforms often amplify the representations of governments even when those representations 
are inaccurate. 
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In short, the prevailing incentives push States to acknowledge the 
seriousness of allegations that implicate jus cogens while re-describing their 
own conduct in a manner that eludes those norms. When States offer false 
denials, they will have no choice but to mis-describe their conduct in a 
manner that whitewashes the moral disapproval warranted by their 
violations, and specifically to reverse the critical moral assessment that 
accompanies those violations. The effect is to reinforce the bare existence of 
the norms while eroding their reach—narrowing the scope of applicable 
norms by creating an international disagreement about whether this specific 
conduct qualifies,84 and introducing deeply misleading euphemisms in the 
process. 
As noted above, the criteria for elevating a norm to peremptory status 
are elusive.85 But it is more difficult still to identify the precise boundaries of 
any norm,86 and, to the extent that particularly widespread agreement about 
the status of a norm underlies its elevation, agreement about its scope is 
similarly important, at least in the first instance.87 It is therefore especially 
significant to observe that States face incentives to use euphemism to 
 
 84 In taking the position that the CIA’s interrogation practices did not rise to the level of torture, the 
U.S. government also generated a dispute about the definition of the word “torture,” and the mere 
existence of that dispute carried legal consequences under domestic law. High-level government actors 
are well aware of that effect. See, e.g., Okun, supra note 64 (quoting former Vice President Dick Cheney 
as saying that the U.S. should reinstate its torture program, observing: “I think the techniques we used 
were not torture. A lot of people try to call it that, but it wasn’t deemed torture at the time. People want 
to go back and try to rewrite history, but if it were my call, I’d do it again.”) (emphasis added). This 
“debate” was enough to immunize certain government officials from some forms of legal liability. See, 
e.g., Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 750, 768 (9th Cir. 2012) (granting qualified immunity to John Yoo, an 
author of the torture memos, in a suit brought by a detainee alleging torture, in part because whether his 
treatment amounted to torture “was not clearly established in 2001-03,” a “time [of] considerable debate, 
both in and out of government, over the definition of torture as applied to specific interrogation 
techniques”). See also Steve Vladeck, Why Padilla Should Bother You (if Not Yoo), LAWFARE (May 2, 
2012, 7:44 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-padilla-should-bother-you-if-not-yoo (critiquing 
that decision). 
 85 See supra Section I. 
 86 Some peremptory norms—especially those that are the subject of dedicated treaties—present 
natural starting points for articulated definitions. The norm barring torture is one of these. See Convention 
Against Torture, supra note 48. But even such definitions leave room for interpretation or manipulation. 
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM J. HAYNES II, 
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEP’T OF DEFENSE, RE: MILITARY INTERROGATION OF ALIEN UNLAWFUL 
COMBATANTS HELD OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 36-49 (Mar. 14, 2003) (analyzing the term “torture”—
as defined in certain federal statutes and the Convention Against Torture—in a manner that did not 
encompass EITs). 
 87 There is an undeniably uneasy relationship between State consent and peremptory norms. Until 
enough States agreed that torture, for example, is always impermissible, the ban on torture did not rise to 
the level of a peremptory norm. Once a critical mass of States agreed on that, however, later (isolated) 
dissent from the prevailing view became irrelevant to the force of the norm. Derogation is now 
impermissible. Yet that could change, in theory, if dissent too reaches a critical mass sufficient to relegate 
the norm. The individual views of States therefore matter until they do not; they matter in clumps. 
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generate disagreement specifically about the scope of peremptory norms 
even as they feel pressured to reaffirm the weight of those norms. Moreover, 
as the next Section explores, the euphemistic character of false denials 
carries significant additional implications. 
III. DOWNSTREAM IMPLICATIONS OF EUPHEMISM: THE CIA TORTURE 
PROGRAM AS A CASE STUDY 
States stand in a privileged position vis-à-vis the individuals they 
comprise and vis-à-vis the law itself. Through their statements, governments 
direct the conduct of their officials, shape public opinion, and mold both the 
content of the law and the historical record. In other words, States possess a 
peculiar capacity to influence because of the special power of sovereign 
speech. The manner in which States exercise that capacity is a matter of 
public concern in general, but State messaging takes on particular 
significance in the context of jus cogens. As the foregoing suggests, this is 
because States face a specific incentive to manipulate the description of their 
conduct in a manner that completely reverses the moral judgment that would 
otherwise attach, and because the nature of those descriptions allows states 
to slide subtly between making legal and moral claims. In adopting 
euphemistic descriptions, States therefore create a cascading effect of unique 
public significance. 
A. Euphemism Anchors Public Debate in the State’s Favor 
Once they become part of the government’s language for describing 
unlawful conduct, euphemisms further distort the public debate over the 
policies at issue and become part of the historical record. Elsewhere I have 
argued that euphemisms can operate as propaganda,88 but their propensity to 
do so is especially high in the context of jus cogens. The moral force of 
peremptory norms is bound up inextricably with their substantive content; 
that is an essential feature of their peremptory status. As a result, a 
description that misleadingly moves the moral window for assessing a given 
policy by definition impedes the public’s understanding of it. That is not to 
say that all members of the public would uniformly agree that a particular 
violation of jus cogens is morally terrible (even though near uniformity 
around the globe on that issue is presumed at the State level). Rather, such 
euphemisms operate to prime the debate in favor of the government. 
Moreover, that effect can be substantial because of the power of sovereign 
speech and because of the sheer distance between the competing 
characterizations of the conduct at issue. 
 
 88 See Sinha, supra note 83, at 1111–12. 
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This priming effect appeared in the debate over the United States’ 
interrogation practices. For instance, during the years of its operation and 
even long afterward, much (although far from all) of the media’s discussion 
of the CIA program accepted the government’s “enhanced interrogation” 
framing, whether out of agreement, deference, or simply an interest in 
avoiding seemingly semantic disputes.89 Additionally, even those who 
resisted that term at times allowed it to anchor the debate. One salient 
alternative phrase utilized in political debates about U.S. detention practices 
in the War on Terror was “torture-lite.” That phrase appeared in commentary 
and news coverage that grasped for a label to capture divergent perspectives 
on the program in question.90 “Torture-lite” offers a midpoint between legal, 
morally essential conduct on one hand and absolutely impermissible conduct 
on the other. The word “lite” often appears on commercial packaging to 
denote products featuring fewer calories than comparable products, or less 
of some other undesirable substance.91 As part of the phrase “torture lite,” 
the word “lite” therefore implies less torturous torture, and it does so in an 
inherently frivolous way. 
But there is no such thing as “torture-lite.” It is certainly not a legal 
concept; indeed, there already exists a legal term for mistreatment of 
detainees that falls short of torture: cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, 
or CIDT.92 Although the legal analysis for CIDT is different from the legal 
analysis for torture,93 there is no particularly interesting debate to be had 
 
 89 See, e.g., ‘The Report’ Looks At Investigation Into CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Program, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Nov. 13, 2019, 4:51 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/13/779015054/the-report-looks-at-
investigation-into-cias-enhanced-interrogation-program (adopting the government’s terminology); Wolf 
Blitzer Hosts CNN’s Late Edition, CNN (Jan. 15, 2006), 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0601/15/le.01.html); Dana Priest, Ex-CIA Official Defends 
Detention Policies: Careful Vetting, Approval Cited, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2004), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/10/27/ex-cia-official-defends-detention-
policies/4a6d9556-cc4a-44a5-b682-baca7c042879/ (“The chairman and vice chairman of the House and 
Senate committees were briefed, without staff members present, on the 
new enhanced interrogation techniques being employed by the CIA against selected terrorist suspects 
soon after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.”) 
 90 See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, Torture-lite: It’s wrong, and it might work, WASH. POST (May 27, 
2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/torture-lite-its-wrong-and-it-might-
work/2011/05/19/AGWIVzCH_story.html (using the term); Duncan Campbell, US interrogators turn to 
‘torture lite’, GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2003, 7:35 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jan/25/usa.alqaida (also using the term). 
 91 See Lite, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/lite?s=t (last visited Feb 6. 
2021). See also, e.g., MILLER LITE: OUR BEER, https://www.millerlite.com/our-beer (last visited Feb 6. 
2021); SPAM LITE, https://www.spam.com/varieties/spam-lite (last visited Feb 6. 2021). 
 92 See Convention Against Torture, supra note 48, art. 1(1), 16. 
 93 See, e.g., Manfred Nowak, What Practices Constitute Torture?: US and UN Standards, 28 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 809, 836 (2006) (the United States ratified the Convention Against Torture on the understanding 
that the treaty’s stipulations about CIDT align with prohibitions contained in the U.S. Constitution). 
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about the propriety of “merely” subjecting one’s detainees to CIDT instead 
of torture. Like torture, CIDT is prohibited both under the Convention 
Against Torture and arguably under jus cogens.94 
As charted below, “torture-lite” is, at best, a contrived, ambiguous, lay 
term that primarily carries a vague descriptive and moral connotation. It 
implies some unspecified form of mistreatment of detainees that falls just 
short of torture.95 By incorporating the word “torture,” the term suggests a 
severity that “enhanced interrogation” does not, but “torture-lite” 
nevertheless serves to confuse the debate by allowing the government’s 
framing to anchor the disagreement closer to a favorable legal and moral 
position. To adopt the term is to buy into the government’s framing of its 
techniques as somewhat less severe than “pure” torture would be. In short, 
“torture-lite” is also euphemistic; the term’s existence reflects the hesitance 














B. Euphemism Primes Government Officials to Carry Out Abuses and 
Adopt Additional Misleading Language 
Government officials also struggle to reconcile the radically different 
possible characterizations of the norm-violating programs they have been 
 
 94 See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, supra note 33, at 340. 
 95 See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, The ‘Graywashing’ of CIA Torture, ATLANTIC (Dec. 11, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/the-graywashing-of-cia-torture/383633/ (placing 
“torture-lite” lower on the moral spectrum than torture: “As the Senate report on CIA interrogations 
courses through the national media this week, the once-popular notion that the Bush administration 
never really tortured anyone, or engaged only in ‘torture-lite,’ is no longer a tenable position.’”); Ross 
Douthat, Thinking About Torture, ATLANTIC (Dec. 16, 2008), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/personal/archive/2008/12/thinking-about-torture/55869/ (claiming that 
torture-lite has “been mostly ‘stress positions,’ extreme temperatures, and ‘smacky-face,’ not [as one 
might associate with torture,] thumbscrews and branding irons.”). 
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asked to implement, operating under assurances that they are undertaking 
vital and lawful work even as they may well recognize that those assurances 
are questionable. In this context, when the State’s characterization is 
incorrect, its choice of euphemism facilitates further violations of 
peremptory norms, and forms the basis for the creation of an entirely new 
euphemistic vocabulary utilized by the officials who put the program into 
action. The testimony given by Mitchell and Jessen offers a window into this 
phenomenon. 
On one hand, the government’s story about the nature and need for the 
CIA’s interrogation program ensured that Mitchell and Jessen felt heavy 
pressure to extract information from detainees to stop another imminent (and 
possibly catastrophic) terrorist attack.96 They faced appeals to their 
patriotism, and they were assured that lawyers had signed off on their 
interrogation program (which implied that the techniques fell short of torture 
morally as well).97 Mitchell and Jessen’s testimony reveals resentment at 
being sued over the interrogations; they claim they reasonably attempted to 
follow legal guidance and they believe that, unlike certain other officials, 
they did not step outside the authority they were given.98 
 
 96 See Mitchell Dep. at 219:19–220:8 (describing the nuclear threat used to pressure Mitchell to assist 
in the initial interrogation of Abu Zubaydah); Jessen Dep. at 105:19–109:2 (relating a similar story, and 
noting how little time Jessen was given to decide whether to assist). See also KSM Transcript at 30429:20-
30430:1 (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS22Jan2020-
AM-MERGED).pdf 
(documenting Mitchell’s testimony that, when the duo sought to dial back the use of EITs on Abu 
Zubaydah, CIA officials accused the two of being “pussies” who “had lost [their] spine[s],” reminded 
them of the threat of another terrorist attack, and claimed Mitchell and Jessen “would have the blood of 
dead Americans on [their] hands.”). 
 97 Mitchell Dep. at 150:15-20 (noting that he perceived a “patriotic duty” to participate in the 
“campaign against al-Qaeda,”); KSM Transcript at 31663:4-9 (Jan. 28, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS28Jan2020-PM-
MERGED)_Part2.pdf (reflecting Mitchell’s view that it was an “honor to be part of the fight,”); KSM 
Transcript at 31648:11-18 (Jan. 28, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS28Jan2020-PM-
MERGED)_Part2.pdf (documenting Mitchell’s testimony that he relied on the representations of the 
President and other high-ranking officials (as well as lawyers) that the techniques were lawful); KSM 
Transcript at 30968:22-969:4 (Jan. 24, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS24Jan2020-MERGED).pdf 
(capturing Mitchell’s rejection of the notion that the “use of EITs [w]as torture because [they] had been 
approved by the President, briefed to the National Security Council, judged by the OLC of the Department 
of Justice to be legal, approved by the Director of the CIA, carefully monitored by medical physicians 
when these things were occurring.”); KSM Transcript at 31199:3-10 (Jan. 27, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS27Jan2020-MERGED)_Part2.pdf 
(claiming that Mitchell had “every reason to believe [the program] was legal,” and “wouldn’t have done 
it” if it were not.). 
 98 See Jessen Dep. at 185:3-186:7 (“[Unlike other officials, w]e didn’t string people up by their arms, 
we didn’t short chain them to walls until they froze to death, we didn’t threaten them with drills and guns. 
We did exactly – we did due diligence. We said, This is tough work, and we will do it for our country, 
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At the same time, as the historical consensus suggests, even parts of the 
program administered by Mitchell and Jessen were objectively atrocious and 
amounted to violations of jus cogens. The testimony shows the pair 
recognized the moral problems with their conduct at some level; they 
struggled to reconcile these divergent assessments, lurching between 
acknowledging and minimizing the brutality of EITs. For example, at times, 
Mitchell describes waterboarding in particularly graphic terms.99 In 
testimony, he acknowledges that it is “horrible,”100 and, in an interview, he 
once suggested that most people would prefer to have their leg broken to 
being waterboarded.101 Jessen testified that he and Mitchell even sought input 
from the very first CIA detainee on a replacement technique because neither 
of them wanted to waterboard future detainees.102 Yet Mitchell has also 
insisted that waterboarding is merely “uncomfortable” and “distressing,” and 
that, although “it sucks,” he does not “know that it’s painful.”103 Mitchell 
pointed out that he had been waterboarded multiple times (though not, as the 
CIA detainees had been, without consent while detained by foreign 
power).104 
Similarly, Mitchell acknowledged that “walling”—the controlled 
slamming of detainees against a wall—was among the most powerful EITs 
the CIA utilized, and one that potentially lends itself to abuse.105 At the same 
 
but it has to be legal and it has to be within the bounds that’s (sic) acceptable to our nation and our 
government, and we were told, Yes, it is, here it is. This is what you can do, this is how you can do it. If 
you decide you want to do anything else, you ask us. Which we did. Every single time, meticulously”); 
see also KSM Transcript at 30429:20-30430:7 (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS22Jan2020-AM-MERGED).pdf 
(recording Mitchell’s testimony to the effect that, when he and Jessen resisted continued application of 
EITs to Abu Zubaydah, the CIA pushed back and implied “that if we weren’t willing to carry their water, 
that they would send someone else who would do it . . . and that they may be harsher.”). See also Mitchell 
Dep. at 344:3-11 (noting that Mitchell and Jessen became more involved in the training of interrogators 
after a previous chief interrogator was fired for “once again using an unapproved technique.”). 
 99 See JAMES E. MITCHELL & BILL HARLOW, ENHANCED INTERROGATION 73 (Crown Publishing 
Group 2016) (noting the “intensity” of witnessing waterboarding in person as opposed to the “sterile” 
experience of watching it on a monitor, and vividly describing how the former allows one to “hear [the 
subject], smell the smells, and feel the spray of the water and snot when [the subject] cleared his sinuses.”) 
According to Mitchell, one waterboarding session of Abu Zubaydah, administered purely for 
demonstrative purposes, “left everyone, even those observing, tearful.” Id. at 75. 
 100 KSM Transcript at 30459:9 (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS22Jan2020-AM-MERGED).pdf. 
 101 See Mitchell Dep. at 291:20-292:23. 
 102 See Jessen Dep. at 251:10-13. 
 103 Mitchell Dep. at 291:7-17. 
 104 See KSM Transcript at 31351:14-17 (Jan. 27, 2020) 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS27Jan2020-MERGED)_Part4.pdf. 
See also Jessen Dep. at 126:4-9 (making the same point.). 
 105 See KSM Transcript at 31883:10-20 (Jan. 29, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS29Jan2020-MERGED).pdf. 
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time, Mitchell testified that walling is one of two techniques that he 
encouraged the CIA to focus on deploying;106 and he refused to concede that 
it is painful or even unpleasant, sparring with an attorney who characterized 
it as such and eventually accepting the description of it as “disorienting” and 
“mildly aversive.”107 Elsewhere he has referred to it as “discombobulating,” 
insisting that, “if it’s painful, you’re doing it wrong”; and, echoing his 
discussion of waterboarding, he claimed he had been walled “hundreds, 
maybe thousands of times.”108 
These contradictory statements reveal that Mitchell and Jessen were not 
fully sold on the government’s assurances about the propriety of their 
project. Other segments of testimony reinforce that conclusion. For example, 
Mitchell found it “in retrospect distasteful”109 that he once threatened to “cut 
[Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s] son’s throat,” even though he testified that he 
carefully constructed the threat in conditional form so that (per an unnamed 
lawyer’s guidance) the threat would not amount to torture.110 More revealing 
still, while he was applying EITs to Abu Zubaydah in the early days of the 
program, the prospect of future accountability made Mitchell so 
uncomfortable about being captured on videotape administering the 
techniques that he sought to have a high-ranking CIA official appear on 
interrogation tapes as well.111 Similarly, after watching those tapes, he 
advocated for their destruction because they were “ugly.”112 But the 
assurances issued by the government, which history has proved false and 
euphemistic, were sufficient to ensure Mitchell and Jessen’s continued 
participation in the program. 
 
 106 Mitchell Dep. at 331:10-15. 
 107 See KSM Transcript at 31883:10-20 (Jan. 29, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS29Jan2020-MERGED).pdf. 
 108 Mitchell Dep. at 360:11-12, 361:1-9. 
 109 KSM Transcript at 31362:19-20 (Jan. 27, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS27Jan2020-MERGED)_Part4.pdf. 
 110 See KSM Transcript at 31361:13-362:20 (Jan. 27, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS27Jan2020-MERGED)_Part4.pdf. 
 111 KSM Transcript at 30432:14-20 (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS22Jan2020-AM-MERGED).pdf 
(Q: Because the tape [of the interrogations] is running, and you wanted somebody more senior if 
accountability ever came down the pike? A. I mean, I wish that wasn’t (sic) true, but my mental calculus 
on it at the time was Dr. Jessen and I were the only two people on that tape, you know, other than the 
guards who were, you know, covered; and that if they were going to try to force us to continue to (sic) 
this, I wanted other CIA officers on that tape.”). 
 112 Mitchell Dep. at 386:6-387:6. The CIA ultimately destroyed the tapes on the order of National 
Clandestine Service director Jose Rodriguez. Tabassum Zakaria, Ex-CIA official says tapes destroyed to 
prevent al Qaeda reprisals, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-
interrogation/ex-cia-official-says-tapes-destroyed-to-prevent-al-qaeda-reprisals-
idUSBRE84003D20120501.  
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Trapped between the personal experience of subjecting detainees to 
egregious mistreatment and the government’s promises that the treatment 
both fell short of torture and was necessary for national security, Mitchell 
and Jessen introduced a whole new vocabulary of euphemisms to describe 
the nature of their program.113 As Mitchell himself observed, the construction 
of euphemism is a common development among abusive interrogators, even 
in training settings.114 Yet, in their testimony, neither Mitchell nor Jessen 
betray awareness that they, too, adopted obviously misleading and morally 
sanitized descriptions of their roles. 
Some of those euphemisms concerned the conditions of the detainees 
themselves. For instance, Mitchell described the initial period of Khalid 
Shaikh Mohammed’s detention as “tea and treats,”115 and summarized the 
totality of Mohammed’s detention as comprising “21 days of enhanced 
interrogation. And then after that, he got 1,287 days of rubbing his belly 
and . . . bringing him things to keep him working with us.”116 (Even when he 
was not being waterboarded, walled, deprived of sleep, or otherwise 
subjected to EITs, significant portions of Mohammed’s detention by the CIA 
were characterized by isolation from other detainees, the presence of bright 
lights and loud noise 24 hours per day, and forced nudity, with a bucket for 
a toilet or, in the alternative, an adult diaper.)117 Other descriptions adopted 
by the interrogators sanitize their own roles. For example, Mitchell referred 
to certain sessions with detainees for evaluating the detainees’ psychological 
responses to being interrogated—sessions that did not involve the 
application of EITs—as “fireside chats,”118 deliberately evoking the 
comforting presidential addresses given by President Franklin Roosevelt.119 
 
 113 See Margot Williams, At Guantánamo Bay, Torture Apologists Take Refuge in Empty Code 
Words and Euphemisms, THE INTERCEPT (Jan. 29, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2020/01/29/guantanamo-9-11-forever-trials/ (noting James Mitchell’s use of 
euphemism during his testimony in the 9/11 case). 
 114 See supra note 61. 
 115 KSM Transcript at 31258:4-13 (Jan. 27, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS27Jan2020-MERGED)_Part3.pdf. 
 116 Id. at 31218:2-6. 
 117 See KSM Transcript at 31280:3-31285:23 (Jan. 27, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS27Jan2020-MERGED)_Part3.pdf 
(describing some of these conditions). According to Mitchell, Mohammed’s conditions of confinement 
changed substantially over time, though it is unclear exactly what configuration of conditions he 
experienced for much of his time in CIA custody. See id. at 31291:4:-31293:8 (discussing the extent of 
Mohammed’s solitary confinement in general terms). 
 118 See KSM Transcript at 30866:3-868:7 (Jan. 23, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS23Jan2020-MERGED).pdf. 
 119 See KSM Transcript at 31566:14-567:11 (Jan. 28, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS28Jan2020-PM-
MERGED)_Part1.pdf. 
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Additionally, when asked about his role in confronting detainees who had 
ceased to be cooperative, Mitchell likened himself to an “ombudsman,” 
stating that “most of the time we sided with the detainees.”120 Yet if detainees 
ceased cooperating, Mitchell and Jessen would threaten them with “going 
back to hard times”—a return to “enhanced interrogation.”121 
In fact, the CIA’s torture program was not just named euphemistically; 
it sprung from a euphemism as well. Mitchell and Jessen recommended 
interrogation techniques that ultimately came to form the backbone of the 
CIA’s program—the “EITs”122—after Mitchell attended a meeting in which 
he was told that “the gloves were off” for handling certain detainees123 in the 
War on Terror.124 Mitchell interpreted that phrase to mean that the CIA had 
already resolved to use coercion against detainees, and thus he suggested 
techniques that he believed would suit that purpose.125 As noted above, 
Mitchell himself found “enhanced interrogation” to be a euphemistic label 
for those techniques,126 yet he nevertheless adopted that exact phrase as the 
title of his memoir about the program.127 
CONCLUSION 
This essay argues that the distinctive nature of jus cogens norms 
translates into underappreciated patterns in State conduct. For one, the 
special moral nature of peremptory norms creates specific incentives for 
States in interacting with them—incentives that render the norms 
simultaneously self-reinforcing in name and self-undermining in scope. 
 
 120 KSM Transcript at 31145:12-21 (Jan. 27, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS27Jan2020-MERGED)_Part1.pdf. 
 121 Id. at 31148:18-149:17. 
 122 See supra note 58. 
 123  KSM Transcript at 30291:1-292:16 (Jan. 21, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS21Jan2020-MERGED).pdf; KSM 
Transcript at 31750:13-21 (Jan. 29, 2020), 
https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS29Jan2020-MERGED).pdf. See also 
MITCHELL & HARLOW, supra note 99, at 12 (reporting the same). The “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” adopted by the CIA for its program derive from the U.S. military’s SERE (“Survive, Evade, 
Resist, Escape”) Program, which subjects certain members of the U.S. armed forces to controlled doses 
of mistreatment to prepare them for the possibility of similar treatment if they are ever captured by hostile 
powers. Mitchell Dep. at 185:11-187:3. Mitchell and Jessen each spent time working at “SERE school” 
before contracting to assist the CIA. Mitchell Dep. at 43:17-44:14; Jessen Dep. at 37:7-38:19. 
 124 Haim Abraham has plausibly pointed out to me that the term “War on Terror” is itself 
euphemistic. 
 125 See Mitchell Dep. at 192:6-19 (describing Mitchell’s basis for concluding that the CIA sought 
harsh interrogation techniques); Mitchell Dep. at 280:19-281:3 (claiming Mitchell suggested SERE 
techniques under the circumstances because they have been used safely for decades by the U.S. military). 
 126 See KSM Transcript, supra note 461. 
 127 See MITCHELL & HARLOW, supra note 99. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
30 
Moreover, although it may be prudent and predictable for States to be 
strategic in selecting the language they use to shape public opinion—and 
unsurprising if those efforts at times include the use of misleading or 
manipulative descriptions and labels—the link between euphemism and jus 
cogens is intrinsic. In contexts where a State’s conduct implicates a 
peremptory norm (or something close to it), the use of misleading description 
is a necessary feature of its (false) denial of liability. And given the 
purportedly inviolable nature of peremptory norms, those misleading 
descriptions are likely to be maximally euphemistic—casting the conduct in 
question as morally obligatory rather than abhorrent. Such characterizations 
are deeply distortive; they threaten significant downstream consequences for 
multiple audiences, including the public at large and the government officials 
who operate within the government’s chosen linguistic framework. All these 
ostensibly disparate phenomena trace back to the peculiar moral nature of 
jus cogens. 
